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REs JumcATA-FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASEs-EFFECT oF P:AsT
DECISION AS TO LIABILITY FOR FUTURE YEARS -This action was brought
by the United States Government to compel the application of rental sums, due
semi-annually by the Western Union Telegraph Company, as lessee, to the
Northwestern Telegraph Company, as lessor, to the payment of the lessor's
income tax indebtedness for the years 1927-1941. In a prior suit between the
same parties for application of other rental sums, due under the same lease, to
the lessor's income tax liability for the years 1917-1922, it was determined by
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit that the government could
not reach these rentals because by the terms of the lease they were payable to the
lessor's stockholders rather than to the lessor.1 This prior judgment was held to
be reft- judicata in the second suit, notwithstanding the decision had been over-

1

(D.C.N.Y. 1926) 19 F. (2d) 157.
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ruled by the same court which rendered it.2 United States v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 553.
Volume 23 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (p. u61) states:
"The estoppel of a judgment extends only to the facts as they were at the time
the judgment was rendered : • . and when new facts intervene before the
second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties
respectively, the issues are no longer the same, and consequently the former
judgment cannot be pleaded in bar." The question arises, is a change in the
law (by virtue of a judicial decision overruling the holding in a prior suit) a
change in the facts so as to prevent the operation of estoppel by judgment? The
· general rule seems to place legislative changes by statute in a different category
from judicial changes of mind as to what the law is, and while the former are
considered to revise the fact situation so as to create a new title and a new and
distinct cause of action in the plaintiff upon different issues,8 an overruling
judicial decision is not such a change in the law as will warrant the court declaring that a new fact situation has arisen. This was indicated in United States
v. Moser 4 where the doctrine of collateral estoppel was invoked to require the
continued payment of a pension sum to a retired haval officer even though, since
the first litigation between Moser and the government, the court, as to other
officers in the same category, had found them not legally entitled to that type
of pension. It was held that Moser should receive future payments under the
prior decision. 5 A departure from this doctrine appears in Blair v. C ommissionere
where the court said that the ruling in Tait v. Western Maryland 7 applied only
where the questions of fact and.law in the second suit were essentially the same
as in the first; and that an intervening decision of a state court (lliinois) declaring that the law was otherwise than had been held by the federal court in the
previous case, created a neyr situation and res judicata did not operate. The
court in the princip•al case, however, rejects the applicability of the doctrine of
2
United States v. Warren R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 134. United
States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 135 F (:id) 711.
3 Campbell v. Gullo, 142 La. 1082, 78 So. 124 (1918). Where after a judgment
was rendered that D was liable for rents under a certain lease, the city passed an
ordinance which prohibited the use to which the leased premises were being put. On
a suit for rents subsequently falling due it was held the first judgment was not conclusive
as to the obligation to pay future rent. The court said the former adjudication is not
a bar because for the present "demand is founded upon something that has happened
since the judgment was rendered" (p 1 1085).
4
266 U.S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66 (1924).
5 " • • • a fact, question or right distinctly ~djudged in the original action cannot
be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon
an erroneous application of the law. That would Be to affirm the principle in respect
of the thing adjudged but, at the same time, to deny it all efficacy .by sustaining a
challenge to the grounds upon which the judgment was based." The court thus states
the reason for its application of estoppel by judgment in United States v. Moser, 266
U.S. 236 at 242 (1924).
6
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330 (1937),
.
7 289 U.S. 620, 53 S. Ct. 706 (1933) which held that an adjudication of
income tax liability for one year was res judicata as to that taxpayer's liability in
subsequent years.
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the Blair case and seeks to distinguish the situation at bar. The court said the
intervening decision in Blair v. Commissioner was that of a state court interpreting state law, which interpretation,8 it was bound to apply. It would appear
that the distinction is an artificial one at best. Are the intervening, overruling
decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case any less binding upon the
federal district court than that of the Illinois Supreme Court in the Blair case? It
is submitted that the situation in the instant case more closely parallels that in
Blair v. Commissioner than the Western Maryland case. In Tait v. Western
Maryland R. Co. there was no intervening overruling decision. Thus the facts
and law were exactly the same in both suits and res judicata was quite properly
applied. However, as the court pointed out in the Blair case, where the law
has been changed ( whether by statute or judicial decision) a new siruation arises,
new factors come into play, and the former judgment should not be a bar to
subsequent actions as an estoppel by judgment.9
Margaret Groefesma

8

304 U.S." 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).

(Amerjcan Law Institute) § 70 (1942) sets forth
the following rule: "Where a question of law essential to a judgment is actually litigated
and determined by valid and final personal judgment, the determination is not conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action upon a different cause of action,
except where both causes of action arose out of the same subject matter or transaction;
and in any event it is not conclusive if injustice· would result."
9 JunGMENTS RESTATEMENT

